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Abstract:  
The objective of this paper is to show how Descartes worked out his mechanical 
philosophy. So the first step to reach this goal led Descartes to criticize and to abandon 
the obscure notion of ‘substantial form’, which was widely employed by the Scholastics 
to explain all events concerning natural beings in a qualitative way. Having rejected the 
substantial forms, the next step would be to establish a new subject matter for natural 
philosophy, which he found in the material body (res extensa) and its geometrical 
properties. Finally, we will see that from these modifications introduced by Descartes in 
the object of study of natural philosophy will also emerge a new method of investigating 
and explaining natural phenomena based on the principles of mechanics and 
mathematics. Nonetheless, we will conclude by claiming that nothing of this will suffice 
to exclude substantial forms from natural philosophy and that is why metaphysics will 
play a fundamental role in Descartes’ philosophical system. 
Keywords: Descartes, Scholasticism, Natural philosophy, Substantial form, Res 
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Resumo:  
O objetivo desse artigo é mostrar como Descartes elaborou sua filosofia mecanicista. O 
primeiro passo para atingir esse objetivo levou Descartes a criticar e a abandonar a 
obscura noção de ‘forma substancial’, que era amplamente empregada pelos 
Escolásticos para explicar todos os eventos referentes aos seres naturais de uma maneira 
qualitativa. O próximo passo após rejeitar as formas substanciais seria estabelecer um 
novo objeto de investigação para a filosofia natural, o qual ele encontrou na matéria 
corpórea (res extensa) e suas propriedades geométricas. Enfim, veremos que dessas 
modificações introduzidas por Descartes no objeto de estudo da filosofia natural vai 
emergir um novo método de investigar e explicar os fenômenos naturais baseado nos 
princípios da mecânica e da matemática. Todavia, nós concluiremos afirmando que 
nada disso será suficiente para excluir as formas substanciais da filosofia natural e é por 
isso que a metafísica desempenhará um papel tão importante no sistema filosófico de 
Descartes. 
Palavras-chave: Descartes, Escolástica, Filosofia natural, Formas substanciais, Res 
extensa 
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In his Discourse on method, which can be read as a kind of intellectual 
biography, Descartes tells us that he was very upset by the education he received in his 
early ages. In fact, he esteems that there is little worth in the studies he had made in his 
youth: 
From my childhood they fed me books, and because people convinced me that these could 
give me clear and certain knowledge of everything useful in life, I was extremely eager to 
learn them. But no sooner than I had completed the whole course of study that normally 
takes one straight into the ranks of the learned I completely changed my mind. For I found 
myself tangled in so many doubts and errors that I came to think that my attempts to 
become educated had done me no good except to give me a steadily widening view of my 




Descartes studied at La Flèche, a Jesuit school of great prestigious at his time. 
Indeed, in his own opinion La Flèche was “[...] one of the most famous colleges in 
Europe” (DESCARTES, 1996, p. 5 [AT 6]), where he believed he would find “wise 
men” (ibidem). In this school the bulk of the curriculum was based on Aristotle’s works 
and it was taught through Thomas Aquinas’ commentaries on them2. Accordingly, since 
Aristotle’s system of thought had occupied a central place in his education, Descartes 
blamed him as the main source of his scholar frustration. That is why throughout his 
whole career Descartes will be fighting against the Aristotelian scholastic philosophy. 
In fact, the main goal of the philosophy he will be building over the years of his 
maturity is to undermine the Peripatetic thought in western culture. It was exactly for 
this reason that he wrote the Principia philosophiae, a compilation of his whole 
philosopy intended to replace the scholastic textbooks in the schools and universities. 
 
1 ‘AT’ refers to Rene Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 volumes, Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 
eds. Paris: J. Vrin 1996.  
2 Ariew (1992, p. 60) describes in more detail what the curriculum in a Jesuit school in the seventeenth 
century looks like: “At La Flèche, as in other Jesuit colleges of the time, the curriculum in philosophy 
would have lasted three years (the final three years of a student’s education, from about the age of fifteen 
on). It would have consisted of lectures, twice a day in sessions lasting two hours each, from a set 
curriculum based primarily on Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. During Descartes’ time, the first year was 
devoted to logic and ethics, consisting of commentaries and questions based on Porphyry’s Isagoge and 
Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Topics, Posterior Analytics, and Nicomachean 
Ethics. The second year was devoted to physics and metaphysics, based primarily on Aristotle’s Physics, 
De Caelo, On Generation and Corruption book I, and Metaphysics book I, 2 and II. The third year of 
philosophy was a year of mathematics, consisting of arithmetics, geometry, music and astronomy […]”. 
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Among the courses Descartes took at La Flèche that which he was most 
dissatisfied with was the scientific teaching, that is to say, the natural philosophy or 
physics he studied there. So it comes as no surprise that the scholastic physics will 
become the main target of Descartes’ critiques. This scholastic science seems to have 
made no great progress over the Middle Ages. In fact, as asserted by Gilson (1951, p. 
143), the scholastic natural philosophy Descartes had learned at La Flèche was almost 
the same that was taught in the French universities of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. In other words, the conceptual and philosophical system used to explain the 
way nature operates bequeathed by the Middle Ages was still at work in early modern 
age. Paradoxically enough, at this same time, due to the work of men like Copernicus 
(1473-1543), Kepler (1571-1630) and Galileo (1564-1642), we will be watching the 
spread of the Scientific Revolution of which Descartes will be a central figure. 
The scholastic natural philosophy as well as its ontology were clearly a 
development of Aristotle’s theories about the nature of substance put forward in his 
Metaphysics (book Δ, cap. 18, 1022a 13-23) and in his Physics (book II, 194b 23). The 
Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism postulated that all substance was composed by 
matter and form. The form, the principal component of the substance in Aristotle’s 
view, had two main functions. First, the form had the metaphysical function of 
determining the unity and identity of the substance. In other words, in the metaphysical 
sense ‘form’ indicates what substance is, what is its essence. Second, the form was also 
responsible for all changes or movements – κίνησις, in Aristotle’s terminology (Physics, 
book II, 1, 192b12-15) underwent by “the beings which exist by nature” (τὰ φύσει 
ὄντα)3. This so-called ‘physical sense of form’ is the cause behind all the operations and 
actions happening in the substance. Therefore, it was by the notion of form that 
Aristotle explained not only the metaphysical structure of substances, but also their way 
of functioning and operating. 
 
3 “Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ 
φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ” [Among the beings some exist by 
nature and others exist through different causes. By nature exist the animals and their parts, the plants and 
the simple elements of the bodies, like earth, fire, air and water]. Aquinas is in plain agreement with this 
Aristotelian conception (cf. AQUINAS, Commentaria in libros physicorum, II, l. 1, n. 8). 
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Although, unlike Aristotle, Aquinas stresses the role played by matter in the 
process of individuation of substance, the scholastic natural philosophy will be built 
undoubtedly on the Aristotelian teachings about the nature of substance. According to 
the scholastic ontology, the world was constituted by a large number of substances, each 
of them having its own essence and properties. As held by Aristotle, these essences and 
properties  were determined by a ‘formal’ element,  which was responsible for the 
structure, actions and accidental features of the substance. This is exactly what sustains 
Thomas Aquinas: “Every natural body has some determined substancial form. Since the 
accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents 
should follow upon a determinate form” (AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, I, q. 7, art. 3.). 
This means that all characteristics as well as all intrinsic events relating to the natural 
beings should be assigned to their formal element. Thus, in explaining a natural 
phenomenon we should indicate what is the form which is causing it. Therefore, physics 
must investigate the true nature of each being, i. e. its form, in order to understand the 
way nature acts. The following example shows how substantial forms were used to 
account for the happenings of natural phenomena: “[...] As heat is an active quality 
consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on the 
substantial form of the sun [...]” (AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, I, q. 67. Art; 3)4.  
So the scholastic physics Descartes was taught at La Flèche, in its deep 
agreement with the thought of Aristotle, had as its main task to identify and to classify 
the substantial forms of the natural beings, as well as their accidental forms or real 
qualities through which they manifested their action5. In fact, it was by describing the 
 
4 As we will see below, in his struggle against the qualitative method employed by the scholastic physics, 
Descartes will use the same examples  as  Aquinas did in order to show the clarity and evidence of his 
corpuscular-mechanistic physics in comparison with that of his adversaries. 
5 ‘Real qualities’ or ‘accidental forms’ are contingent properties that inheres in substances, such as color, 
weight, temperature, etc. For instance, the whiteness of milk and the coldness of water, according to 
Scholastics, were due to their substantial forms. 
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qualities that bodies happen to have by virtue of their substantial forms that scholastics 
explained natural phenomena6. 
Therefore, the scholastic natural philosophy was a taxonomic and qualitative 
science which explained physical phenomena by the notion of substantial form. That is 
why it is to “[...] all the qualities and forms [he] hate[s] [...]” (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 
2], p. 74) that Descartes will address his most severe critique, for it was on them that the 
scholastic physics had been built. In refusing the substantial forms, Descartes would 
also be undermining the scholastic natural philosophy altogether. Consequently, the 
Cartesian physics that is supposed to replace that old science will be shaped by all that 
criticism. In fact, Descartes considered the physics he was taught conceptually 
meaningless and useless in its aplication to solve real problems. For him, a science 
based on a principle such as that of substantial form had no capacity whatsoever to 
explain or predict natural phenomena, since “[...] the Form becomes a kind of invisible 
screen between the observer  and the object of his study, which prevents him from 
grasping and measuring and weighing it” (ALLAN, 1970, p. 115). In Descartes’ view, 
on the contrary, natural science requires an approach which focuses not on qualitative 
descriptions of phenomena, but rather in the objective, quantitative features of nature, 
those that allow the scientist to measure and to quantify with precision what he is 
investigating. Thus, from this standpoint, substantial forms and real qualities will be 
replaced by what Descartes call res extensa, that is to say, pure matter and its 
geometrical properties (breadth, length and depth).  
In his work The World or Treatise on light Descartes puts forward his new 
conceptions concerning natural philosophy, which means “[...] a fully mechanist 
alternative to Aristotelian system, one which effectively derives heliocentrism7 from 
 
6 As Hattab explains, it was precisely the existence of these properties in substances that led scholastics to 
postulate substantial forms as its cause (cf. HATTAB, 2009, p. 24). 
7 When he knew about Galileo’s condemnation by the Inquisition, Descartes wrote to Mersenne and 
explained him to what extent his system was commited to Corpenicus’ astronomical views: “[...] If it 
[heliocentrism] is false, so are all the foundations of my philosophy. For it [heliocentrism]  is evidently 
demonstrated by them. And it [heliocentrism] is so closely connected to all the parts of my treatise, so 
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first principles, which offers a novel and apparently viable conception of matter [res 
extensa] and which formulates fundamental laws of motion8 – laws which are clearly 
open to quantitative elaboration” (GAUKROGER, 2002, p. 18.). From the very 
beginning of The World we also find Descartes’ critique of substantial forms. For him, 
substantial forms are the stumbling block which had prevented natural philosophy from 
becoming a true science. For this reason, he refuses to account for natural phenomena 
by meaningless notions such as ‘form’, ‘quality’, ‘action’ and so on, as Aquinas did. In 
his view, a genuinely scientific physics should aim at analysing natural phenomena 
through the constituiting parts of matter and its motion. The pratical application of the 
principles of this new mechanical physics Descartes proposes – and the way in which 
they serve to overcome the scholastic natural philosophy –  can be exemplified by a 
flame that is burning a piece of wood: 
When it [the flame] burns the wood or other similar material we can see with our eyes that 
it moves the small parts of the wood, separating them from one another, thereby 
transforming the finer parts into fire, air, and smoke, and leaving the larger parts as ashes. 
Someone else [that is, the scholastic thinker] may if he wishes imagine the ‘form’ of fire, 
the ‘quality’ of heat, and the ‘action’ of burning to be very different things in the wood. For 
my own part, I am afraid of going astray if I suppose there to be in the wood anything more 
than what I see must necessarily be there, so I am satisfied to confine myself to conceiving 
the motion of its parts” (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 11], p.7).  
It is thus that the Cartesian corpuscular-mechanistic physics, on the one hand, 
opposes the obscure reasons that Aristotle had advanced in order to explain natural 
phenomena – which were widely and sistematically employed by scholastic thinkers – 
and, on the other hand, tries to establish a new model of natural philosophy relying only 
on what he thinks to be clear and evident principles. In other words, Descartes 
endeavors to investigate nature grounded just in measurable and tangible principles as a 
geometer, like Euclides or Pappus, would do. Since, from his standpoint, physics must 
study nothing but material bodies, Descartes justifies this new approach to the study of 
nature by claiming that he had found out that “[...] absolutely nothing belongs to the 
                                                                                                                                               
that I cannot give it [heliocentrism] up without ruining my treatise altogether” (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 
1], p. 271. 
8 See DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 11], pp. 38 e 41 e DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 8], pp. 62-66. 
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nature of body except that it be a thing that has length, breadth and depth and is capable 
of various shapes and motions; and these shapes and motions are merely modes of 
bodies, which no power can cause to exist apart from them” (DESCARTES, 1996 [AT 
7], p. 440). Therefore, for Descartes, physics must be concerned with the study of nature 
just to the extent that it is understood as a geometrical issue, stripped of all soul or 
animated principle. In place of the scholastic substantial forms, Descartes will postulate 
extended matter and the primary qualities inherent to it as the only possible way of 
explaining  natural phenomena. Henceforth, nature will become a mechanical machine. 
One of the most important outcomes produced by this new Cartesian mechanical 
physics lies precisely in the method of explaining natural phenomena. As we have seen,  
the scholastics supposed that movement and change as well as the properties of physical 
beings stemmed from within the body itself caused by an inner principle which they 
called substantial form. As a consequence of this assumption, the scholastic natural 
philosophy was required to postulate as many substantial forms as the natural 
phenomena they were supposed to explain. In other words, there should be one 
substantial form assigned to each particular phenomenon. The mechanical model 
proposed by Descartes, on the other hand, held that movement, and change as well as 
the properties of natural beings should be explained by nothing else except the 
interactions or shocks among the bodies and their constituent parts. Thus, for Descartes, 
the causes of natural phenomena should be assigned to external agents, because bodies 
have no internal power to act by themselves. This assumption, i. e., that matter is 
passive, allowed Descartes to elaborate a set of physical laws which could be applied to 
explain a wide range of phenomena. Therefore, from this pattern of mechanical 
causality it follows that all phenomena should be explained according to a rigorous 
procedure of cause and effect, empirically verifiable and above all mathematically 
measurable. And even though we have to grant that “[...] Descartes is no more able to 
perceive the particles in motion that he takes to give rise to certain sensible properties of 
a body than the scholastic is able to perceive the real quality of heaviness or the 
substantial form of a body” (HATTAB, 2009, pp. 19-20), by advancing a mechanical 
method, a new conception of matter and a new understanding of nature he has 
unquestionably given a great contribution to overcome the qualitative way of 
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explanation conveyed by the Aristotelian scholastics and this way he has put natural 
philosophy on the  secure path of modern science. 
However, despite all Descartes’ efforts to overcome the scholastic natural 
philosophy with his mechanical alternative to substantial forms, it was not enough. Of 
course, in order to refute the scholastic physics one should propose a new scientific 
model which were able to provide better and sound explanation for the phenomena it 
was supposed to account for. Descartes believed he had done that. Nonetheless, since 
the old Aristotelian physics espoused by the Scholastics was grounded in the 
ontological doctrine of hylomorphysm, it will also require a metaphysical argument to 
be completely defeated. That is, it was no doubt necessary, but not sufficient to just 
establish a scientific alternative to replace the scholastic natural philosophy; for in this 
case we would have two scientific theories competing for explaining the same set of 
phenomena at the same time without one eliminating the other. So it was required to 
advance a metaphysical argument which could undermine the hylomorphic ontology 
pressuposed by substantial forms as well. And so did Descartes. 
The most thorough metaphysical attack Descartes delivered against the 
Aristotelian hylomorphism and consequently against the scholastic substantial forms is 
hidden under his thesis about the mind-body dualism or ‘Real Distinction Argument’, as 
it is also called. In effect, the target of Descartes’ dualism thesis is often misunderstood. 
It is commonly believed that in the radical distinction made in the Second Meditation 
between mind and body Descartes is primarily concerned with the mind (ROZEMOND, 
1998, p. 64), since it is through the act of thinking performed by the mind that the first 
metaphysical certainty – “I think, therefore I am” – is stated. According to this 
interpretation, which suits pretty well Descartes’ proclaimed intentons, his main goal in 
that meditation would be to demonstrate that the human soul is not only a purely 
immaterial entity, but also that it is completely independent of the body. So goes the 
story Descartes wanted the theologians of the Faculty of Paris to believe in, above all in 
what concerns its implications for the immortality of the human soul. But Descartes was 
actually more interested in the scientific than in the metaphyscal consequences of his 
dualism. In fact, through the mind-body distinction his true aim was actually to show, in 
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frank opposition to what was defended by the scholastic natural philosophy, that the 
body is purely material and can exist by itself without any soul or form attached to it.   
It is thus that Descartes justifies metaphasically his new mechanistic physics, 
which has as its object just the material extension and its geometrical properties. In 
other words, more than to bring about a metaphysics based on the certainty of the self 
and on the existence of God, through the mind-body distinction Descartes launched the 
foundations of his mathematical physics. In fact, were Descartes’ main concerns to 
really deepen his knowledge about the human soul or even about God, as it is clearly 
stressed by him in the title of the Meditations, he would have tried to work out at length 
a rational psychology or a philosophical theology. However, it is not the case. On the 
contrary, after stating the real distinction between mind and body and giving his proof 
of God’s existence, he always goes on to deal with issues related to scientific matters. It 
is so not only in the Meditations, but also in the Discourse on method and in the 
Principles of philosophy. In the Meditations, his masterpiece, he makes it clear that 
before starting solving any scientific problem it was necessary to metaphisically refute 
the Aristotelian scholastic ontology and to establish a new object for physics. So 
Descartes employs his dualist argument in order to show that soul and body are two 
distinct and independent entities that can exist by themselves. It is thus that he dismisses 
the Aristotelian hylomorphic ontology. By the same token, since  substantial forms were 
thought as a kind of soul that ‘animated’ matter, so to speak, Descartes could also deny 
the necessity of them in science. Henceforth, matter alone, conceived as a true 
substance, should be used in natural philosophy explanation. It is on this principle that 
Descartes will built his mechanical physics. 
From this renovated metaphysical and physical framework, finally stripped of all 
substantial forms, will emerge a mechanical universe constituted solely by physical 
matter. This new Cartesian picture of the universe has only place for extended matter 
and its geometrical properties – shape, motion, and seize. So Descartes’ physics will 
takle just and exclusively the primary qualities of material bodies. That is why we say 
that Descartes reduced physics to geometry. So by mixing up the principles of geometry 
and mechanics Descartes was able to articulate an alternative model to the scholastic 
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natural philosophy. Nonetheless, it was not enough to eliminate the core notion of that 
medieval science. Only through his dualist metaphysics he definitely found out how to 
banish substantial forms from the realm of physics. It is for this reason that Descartes 
claims that his physics is grounded in his metaphysics and so we clearly understand 
why Descartes’ metaphysics is so important to his mechanical philosophy. 
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